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Aberdein, Andrew and Read, Stephen
The Philosophy of Alternative Logics. The Development of Formal Logic, 613–
723, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009
This survey article consist of two parts followed by a conclusive summary and a
brief section with bibliographic hints for “Further Reading”. The first part (pp.
613–640) is devoted to a consideration of the question “What Are Alternative
Logics?” whereas the second part with the title “What Alternative Logics Are
There?” (pp. 641–695) provides four case studies of alternative logics, namely
intuititionistic logic, quantum logic, relevance logic, and paraconsistent logic.
The dynamics of theories and the relationships between competing theories
are standard issues in the philosophy of science. However, most of the discus-
sions of these topics deal with theories from the empirical sciences. The first
part of Aberdein’s and Read’s article therefore is devoted to the development of
a suitable framework for the discussion of these problems with respect to logical
theories. In this endeavour the authors are very much inspired by the work of
Imre Lakatos (cf. MR0560905 and MR0479916). A logical theory is conceived
of as a tool for the formal analysis of natural language argumentation just as
theories from empirical disciplines like physics and chemistry are tools for the
analysis of natural phenomena. A logical theory comprises four components
(1) a formal system together with (2) a formal semantics and a correspond-
ing metatheory, (3) a scheme for the regimentation and translation of natural
language sentences and for the conversion of natural language arguments into
deductions of the formal system, and (4) a “goal”. This goal specifies the es-
sential property which—according to the theory at issue—differentiates valid
arguments from invalid ones. Thus, for instance, preservation of truth (from
arguments to conclusion) is the goal of classical logic (K) whereas “intuitionist
logic is motivated by the preservation of warrant” (p. 617) and paraconsistent
logic “is concerned to avoid triviality rather than falsehood” (ibid.). The formal
system of a logical theory is viewed as the codification of the theory’s notion of
logical consequence rather than as a means for the enumeration of recognized
logical truth or as a definition of the proper notion of proof (p. 614). The just
listed four components of a logical theory make up its “foreground”. Usually, a
logical theory is supplemented by one or more “background theories” providing
its philosophical motiviations (p. 618). — An alternative logic is a proposal for
the revision of classical logic in response to a philosophical or scientific problem.
In the history of logic alternative logics often developed by successive critical
assessments of different traits of classical logic. This means that revisionary
programs typically develop stepwise in time. Hence it is necessary to introduce
into the philosophy of science of logical theory a number of concepts—such as
“revolution”, “research program”, “hard core” (of a theory), “heuristic” (of a
research program), etc.—which have been found useful in the discussion of the
dynamics of empirical theories. The first part of the article thus ends up with
an elobarate classificatory hierarchy of revisionary approaches to classical logic.
The first concrete alternative logic discussed in the article’s second part is
intuitionistic logic J (p. 641–656). The historical origin of intuitionistic logic is
briefly described and the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation of the in-
tuitionistic connectives is provided. Mathematical constructivism and semantic
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antirealism (as argued for by, for instance, Prawitz and Dummett) are discussed
as philosophical background theories motivating J. The relationship between
J and K is treated both from a formal and philosophical perspective. The
question whether J is preferable to K because its (natural deduction) formal-
izations exhibits some distinguished features (such as invertability of deduction
rules and normalizability of proofs) is discussed and answered negatively. The
critical issue in the debate between intuitionistic and classical logic does not
reduce to the question whether formalizations of J have some distinguished
properties lacked by formalizations of K but rather concerns the philosophical
background question of inferential goal (preservation of warrant vs. preservation
of truth simpliciter). The authors argue that the importance of this question
also sets intuitionist logic apart from other revisions of classical logic. Wheras
other alternative logic theories attempt to retain the inferential goal of classical
logic and instead aim at a more transparent translation component, the two
philosophical background theories for J which have been treated in the article
(mathematical constructivism and semantic antirealism) aim at a substantial
revision of principles valid within the classical account.
The second alternative logic considered in the article is quantum logic (p.
656–668). The system QL of quantum logic deriving from the work of von Neu-
mann and Birkhoff (cf. MR1435976, MR1503312) is briefly described together
with what might be called its “Hilbert space semantics”. What renders quan-
tum logic attractive as an alternative to K is its claim that its adoption does
not commit one to “the counterintuitive metaphysical consequences” normally
associated with quantum mechanics (p. 656). The discussion of QL following
the presentation of that system does not, however, attempt to decide on the
justification of that claim but rather considers the conceptual viability of the
revisionary project of quantum logic. Three mutually related issues are dis-
cussed: (1) the compatibility of quantum logic with realism (p. 658–661), (2)
the adequacy of Dummett’s analysis of logical revisionism as leading up either
to cases of mutual unintelligibility or mere relabeling (p. 661–664), (3) the re-
lationship between the meanings of the logical connectives of K and of QL (p.
664–668).
Intuitionistic logic and quantum logic have in common that they differ from
classical logic in their being based upon assumptions and doctrines completely
alien to the classical attitude: for example, the thesis of the inadmissability of
non-constructive reasoning in the case of intuitionistic logic and the view that
logical principle are revisable in view of empirical facts in the case of quan-
tum logic. The next two logics considered in the article, namely relevance logic
and paraconsistent logic, are rather amendments than alternatives to classical
logic. — As regards relevance logic (p. 668–682), the paradoxes of material and
strict implication, the critical logical principles used in their deduction (such
as the disjunctive syllogism, monotonicity, the deduction theorem, etc.), and
the innovations of relevant logics (such as the fusion connective and intensional
disjunction) are discussed. Anderson and Belnap’s formal systems R and E
(cp. MR0406756 and MR1223997) deriving from the works of Ackermann, Moh,
and Church (cf. MR0080607 and MR0040236) and their status as substructural
logics are explained. The model theory of relevant logic is sketched both in
the style of the Meyer-Routley semantics (with its ternary accessibility rela-
tion) and the relational-operational semantics of Kit Fine. In the discussion
of the “relevantist background philosophy” different forms of adherence to the
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“relevantist program” (soft, hard, and true relevantism) are distinguished with
regard to their attitude toward the disjunctive syllogism. The question whether
the formal semantics of relevance logic have intuitive foundations strong enough
to qualify relevance logic as a plausible reform program is extensively discussed.
Paraconsistent logics (p. 682–695) admit for inconsistent theories containing
propositions together with their negations. In the framework of classical logics
with its principle ex contradictione quodlibet (ECQ) (A,¬A |= B) such inconsis-
tent theories all coincide with the entire set of all propositions (of the underly-
ing formal language). Paraconsistent logics allow for “paraconsistent theories”
containing non-trivial inconsistencies which do not “detonate” in the way just
described. Two kinds of motivation are distinguished for the admittance of
paraconsistent theories: (1) Weakly paraconsistent research programs in logic
agree with the background philosophy of classical logic on the assumption that
reality is free of contradictions. Contradictions arise only within collections of
propositions accepted by some (human and/or artificial) reasoners due to some
kind of error committed by them. Thus, for example, a database may have been
updated at different times by data contradicting each other. In such cases, one
would nevertheless often not like to give up the entire theory (database) in spite
of its known inconsistency. Rather one would try to restrict in some way the
devastating effects of the contradiction caused by ECQ to delimited and isolated
portions of the entire theory. (2) Dialetheism (cf. MR1014684) holds that para-
consistent theories may be accurate theories of reality. Thus, according to this
attitude, contradictions are due to reality itself rather than to logical errors of
reasoners. — On the technical level, two strategies for the formal development
of a paraconsistent logic are discussed: (1) that of da Costa’s and Newton’s
use of a series Cn (0 ≤ n ≤ ω) of successive logical systems (cf. MR0354361)
and (2) the use of a logic which roughly conforms to the relevantist program by
modifying the conditional connective. It is argued that the first strategy leads
up to serious problems with negation and with the conditional connective. The
relationship between paraconsistent logics and classical logic is investigated, and
in this a special focus is given to the consideration of those two connectives.
Reviewed by Klaus Robering
3
